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SEQUENCING THE DNA OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
GORDON SILVERSTEIN*
[ W] hy do so many people in so many parts of the world entrust so
much of their governance to judges ?'
Once seen as a uniquely (or quaintly) American phenomenon,
judicial review is suddenly everywhere: From the European Court of
Justice to South Africa; from New Zealand to Hungary; from Israel to
India to Canada and even in such once believed to be unlikely locales
as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.2 Why does judicial review
happen? And what difference does it make?
We tend to examine judicial review not as an independent phe-
nomenon, but as a variable in other contexts, whether in comparative
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. A.B.,
Cornell University; Ph.D., Harvard University. These thoughts have been sharpened and
stimulated by any number of discussions with friends and colleagues, but particularly with
Mark Graber, Robert Kagan, and Martin Shapiro.
1. Martin Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 193, 218 (SallyJ. Kenney et al. eds., 1999).
2. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1
(focusing on Europe and including specific treatment of the European Union, Hungary,
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain); HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITU-
TION-MAKING IN SOUTrH AFRICA (1998); RAN HIRSCHL, TOwAR SJURISTOcRACY. THE ORIGINS
AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (focusing on constitutionaliza-
tion in culturally divided polities, including South Africa, Israel, Canada, and New Zea-
land); JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY (Peter H. Russell & David M.
O'Brien eds., 2001) (focusing on the closely related, though distinct, topic ofjudicial inde-
pendence in the United States, Europe, Australia, South Africa, Israel, Russia, Japan, Hong
Kong, and Central America); HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY. LAW, GLOBALISM AND
SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (2000); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH
JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000); THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL
COURTS-DoCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998); THE
GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbj6rn Vallinder eds., 1995)
(discussing judicialization of political power in the United States, United Kingdom, Austra-
lia, Canada, Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Malta, Israel, Namibia, the
Philippines, and the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe); Lee Epstein et al., The Role
of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government,
35 LAW & Soc'v REv. 117 (2001) (discussing the Russian experience); Kim L. Scheppele,
The New Hungarian Constitutional Court, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 81 (1999). This is just a small
sample of a burgeoning literature on the growth of judicial power and judicial review
around the world.
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politics,' international relations,4 or political theory.5 Often political
science seems to leave the study of judicial review as an independent
phenomenon to lawyers-but lawyers tend to take it as a given, and
the artificial divide between legal scholars and political science has left
a significant void, a lack of a comprehensive treatment of judicial re-
view and its role in the political and policy process.6
One important exception is Martin Shapiro, a founding father of
the study of law and courts as political institutions.7 In a recent vol-
ume, Shapiro offers a compelling synthesis of these arguments, sug-
gesting that the best way to understand why otherwise self-interested
political actors might tolerate growing judicial power, why they might
tolerate strong judicial review, is to think of judicial review as a junk-
yard dog.'
If you own ajunkyard, Shapiro argues, and want to protect it, you
might release a vicious dog at night to patrol the premises.9 The dog
(in this case, strong courts) will do a fine job of protecting you against
others if it is mean enough and unwilling to take orders from anyone.
But of course, if that's true, there is a real risk that this dog might take
a nip out of its master. That may just be the price you have to pay to
use this method of protection. "[I]f the people choose judicial review
courts[,] those courts will make constitutional law just as inevitably as
dogs will bite. And courts unchained against interlopers may well bite
the wrong person from time to time.""°
So strong courts that delve into individual rights from time to
time might be the price we have to pay if we want those same courts to
deliver the things we want and need from them. Ran Hirschl argues,
for example, that declining hegemons have a powerful incentive to
buy one of these beasts.' From President John Adams, contemplat-
ing the horror of surrendering power to Thomas Jefferson in 1801, to
3. E.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993);
HIRSCHL, supra note 2; AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIx COUNTRIES (1999); SWEET, supra note 2.
4. E.g., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 2001).
5. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986);JUDITH N. SHRLAR, LEGALISM (1964);
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
6. LUCAS A. POWEJR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS, at vii (2000); Mark
A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected Rela-
tionship, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 309, 317 (2002).
7. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964).
8. MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, ANDJUDICIALIZATION 163-
64 (2002).
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id. at 164.
11. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 11-12.
[VOL. 65:49
2006] THE DNA OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 51
the decision by South Africa's ruling white minority to insist on strong
courts as the price of peaceful transition to majority rule, there are
powerful incentives for those who fear political control is slipping
from their grasp to vest extraordinary power in courts and judges.
Surely this is one compelling reason why otherwise rational and
powerful political actors might voluntarily surrender power to judicial
actors. But this is not the only incentive for the adoption (or toler-
ance) of strong courts. There are other reasons, other imperatives,
that drive otherwise powerful politicians to buyjunkyard dogs. Some
of these imperatives are institutional, some economic; others might be
driven by political incentives, and some might even be driven by an
interest in preserving and extending underlying rights and norms.
But are these simply a set of discrete incentives, any one of which
might drive a system toward strong judicial review? Or is it possible
that somehow these various imperatives actually interact in a more
complicated way? Are these imperatives separate and discrete build-
ing materials (like wood, steel, brick, and concrete), any one of which
might drive a polity toward strong judicial review, though obviously
with somewhat different characteristics? Or are these building materi-
als present in all cases of strong court systems, though in varying
amounts and varying sequences, somewhat akin to the four nucleo-
tides that sequence together in endless combinations in human
DNA? 2 The current literature has taken us a long way toward under-
standing the various independent building materials. But perhaps we
are now at a stage where we can start to ask whether there is a more
general theory that might integrate these separate parts.
This Essay, of course, ends up asking more questions than it can
answer in the hopes of stimulating discussion. Is there a set of recur-
ring imperatives that push a system toward strong judicial review?
And if so, is there any sort of coherent pattern or sequence to these
imperatives? What difference does it make if the explanation hinges
on one imperative rather than another? Does judicial review gener-
ated by one sort of imperative differ from judicial review generated by
another? Do varying strengths and sequences of these imperatives
help to explain why one nation's form of judicial review is stronger
than another? Why is the emergence of strong courts more problem-
atic in some settings than others? Is judicialization or juristocracy a
broad description of a number of related but distinct institutional
constellations that emerge in response to separate and distinct imper-
12. In DNA, the four nucleotides are adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and gua-
nine (G).
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atives, or can we develop a more general theory about the evolution
and impact of judicial review? Should we even try?
For purposes of this thought experiment, this Essay identifies
four imperatives that seem to drive systems toward strong courts and
judicial review: (1) the institutional imperative; (2) the economic im-
perative; (3) an imperative of rights and norms; and (4) the political
imperative.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE
Scholars have long observed that strong judicial review is most
often observed in political systems with separated or divided powers,
particularly in federal systems. 13 These systems need an arbitrator, a
disinterested third party to resolve disputes between two levels of gov-
ernment, in what Shapiro refers to as a classic triadic dispute-resolu-
tion system.14 Though the division or separation of powers is indeed a
powerful predictor of the emergence of strong judicial review, this in-
stitutional approach has, perhaps, been a bit too narrow. Federalism
and the division of powers are institutional imperatives, but so too are
the structure of these institutions, their relationships, and the very
rules that establish them and their interaction. The rules for the allo-
cation of power are important, but the rules governing when and how
the meta-rules of a constitution can be changed may be even more
important.1 5
New institutionalists might argue that institutions structure strate-
gic choices, noting that structural constraints can help explain the ac-
ceptance or even embrace of strong judicial review. They might also
note that an understanding of the historical evolution of institutions
and the rules that structure those institutions, as well as the wider net
of social developments that constrains that evolution, also help us un-
derstand how and when and why the institutional imperative func-
13. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADvERSARIAL LEGALISM (2001) (comparing legal sys-
tems of economically advanced democracies); LUpHART, supra note 3 (comparing the
strength ofjudicial review in thirty-six democracies); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARA-
TIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981) (comparing the role of courts in European, Chinese,
and Islamic systems); KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (discussing thejudiciary's role in a divided
system of political actors).
14. SHAPIRO, supra note 13.
15. See Jack Knight, Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation, in CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 361, 387-88 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that
strict amendment rules enhance efficacy of government action); LIJPHART, supra note 3, at
228-30 (arguing that strict amendment ruleg are necessary antecedents to effective judicial
review).
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tions. 16 Few would have understood this better than America's first
"new" institutionalist-James Madison-who insisted that institutions
must be designed in such a way that the interests of the individual are
intimately and inextricably linked to the institution itself.'7
Institutional arrangements, particularly in the early path-setting
and institution-building period of a constitutional system, certainly
seem to generate imperatives for judicial review.1 8 Similarly, constitu-
tional rules themselves are vitally important to building the constitu-
tional space needed for judicial review to take root. But institutions
and rules aren't enough. Motives matter, whether they be economic,
normative, or political.
II. ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS
Why would rational, utility-maximizing politicians actually surren-
der power to judicial actors? Shapiro suggests that one answer is "be-
cause they cannot help it."19  This suggests the institutional
imperative. But he acknowledges that the answer might just be "be-
cause they want to."20 And this suggests that there are other impera-
tives to consider. While Shapiro likely was thinking in terms of
normative objectives (see below), we could also argue that our ra-
tional, utility-maximizing politicians might want judicial review (or,
more likely, tolerate judicial review) because it advances their own in-
terests." And as almost any economist would be quick to remind us,
economic interests are among the most powerful incentives we know.
The rule of law is an opaque concept, but one thing it seems to
mean to many people is a society or system where commercial rela-
16. See generally SUPREME COURT DECISION-IMAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton
eds., 1999); Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27
COMP. POL. 231 (1995); Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism,"
and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 89 (1988).
17. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that republican representation is more conducive to the public good than other
political systems used to promote private opinions); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison), supra, at 324 (arguing that governmental distribution of power enables the pur-
suit of private interests to safeguard public rights).
18. See generally PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL
ANALYSIS (2004) (considering the role of increasing returns and path dependence in polit-
ics); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL.
ScI. REv. 251 (2000).
19. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 218.
20. Id.
21. See id at 210 (noting the correlations between competitive party systems and en-
hanced judicial review).
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tions are stable, predictable, transparent, and reliable; contracts are
enforced and property is secure.22 If this was important in the era of
mercantile trade, it may be even more important in our much faster-
paced era of globalization. With investment capital so easily shifted at
the push of a button, some argue that adopting a written constitution
and creating independent courts that have genuine authority are
among the most effective signals one nation can send to others that it
is a reliable investment and trading partner.2" This suggests that even
an authoritarian nation such as China might well be willing to tolerate
the junkyard dog of judicial review as the price for a place at the
globalization banquet. 24
By accepting entrenched legal protections, "countries communi-
cate that they are willing to sacrifice short-term advantages to obtain
long-term benefits such as economic growth. Investors can infer from
this that the government is less likely to pose a threat of opportunistic
behavior such as expropriation. '25 As Hirschl (quoting Max Weber)
notes, "investors lack the incentive to invest" without a secure "predict-
ability interest. '26 And "entrenched legal rights that enhance inves-
tors' trust" lead to "economic growth in various historical contexts."27
This sentiment is clear in a 1995 speech by Lee Kuan Yew, who
served as Singapore's Prime Minister for thirty years. Lee told his par-
liament that when the government is taken to court by a private
individual,
the court must adjudicate upon the issues strictly on their
merits and in accordance with the law. To have it otherwise
is to lose.., our standing and... our status as an investment
and financial centre. The interpretation of documents, of
contracts in accordance with the law is crucial. Our reputa-
tion for the rule of law has been and is a valuable economic
asset, part of our capital, although an intangible one.28
These same economic incentives, the incentives we now think of
as driven by globalization, may help to explain the adoption of a re-
22. Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88-91 (2002).
23. See id, at 88-94 (arguing that constitutionalism increases investment security by
communicating a nation's willingness to protect investors' rights).
24. But see generally Gordon Silverstein, Globalization and the Rule of Law: "A Machine that
Runs of Itsel?.", I INT'LJ. CONST. L. 427 (2003) (arguing that there are severe limits to the
economic incentives for tolerating strong courts).
25. Farber, supra note 22, at 98.
26. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionaliza-
tion: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 91, 137 (2000).
27. Id.
28. Remarks by Lee Kuan Yew, SING. Parl. Deb. col. 236 (Nov. 2, 1995).
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gime of strong judicial review in South Africa. On November 18,
1993, the leaders of all the participating political parties signed an
agreement establishing an interim constitution, one that would bridge
the nation from its apartheid past to a majoritarian future. 29 At the
signing, these leaders "immediately seized the initiative to convince
investors of the value of the new constitutional dispensation. The
message was clear: the country had a constitution that it could 'bank'
on."3 0 The plea hit home and "[o]ffers of financial assistance and aid
poured in. 31
Heinz Klug echoes the argument that the economic pressures
(and appeal) of globalization had a profound effect on the structure
of South Africa's new constitutional and legal system, arguing that
neither of the key parties to the transition from minority to majority
rule was particularly prone to embrace constitutionalism or bills of
rights: The Apartheid regime because it had spent its entire history
insisting on parliamentary sovereignty and claimed that equality had
no place in governance;32 the majority because it had seen the dam-
age that could be done by supposedly impartial, rule-of-law regimes
and the courts that carried out their bidding.3 3 Klug argues that it was
international pressure, international culture, and an interest of both
sides in plugging into that international world that had much to do
with the adoption of strong judicial review in South Africa. 4 There
were powerful political incentives for each to endorse a strong consti-
tutional court, but the economic incentives similarly motivated both
sides as well. 5 Economic incentives can also be seen starkly at work in
a number of the states of Eastern Europe, in no small measure be-
cause economic stability and predictability are seen as prerequisites
for any bid to join the European Union.36 And the European Union
itself moved toward judicial review initially to secure economic inte-
29. EBRAHIM, supra note 2, at 170-71.
30. IdM at 171.
31. Id.
32. See KLuc, supra note 2, at 37-41 (discussing parliamentary attempts to assert
supremacy and entrench racial inequality).
33. See id at 44-45 (discussing the judiciary's complicity in state-sponsored racial
persecution).
34. Id. at 67-68.
35. See EBRAHIM, supra note 2, at 170-71 (discussing the economic advantages of South
Africa's espousal of a constitutional system).
36. See Farber, supra note 22, at 95-96 (discussing constitutionalism as an economic
incentive for new Eastern European regimes).
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gration, only later spilling over into other arenas.37 Though member
states often chafed at court rulings, particularly when doctrine set in
economic cases spilled over to influence decisions in social, cultural,
domestic affairs, and even foreign policy, the economic advantages
were significant.3" When Britain's John Major proposed to severely
limit the court's authority during preliminary negotiations over the
Treaty of European Unity (the Maastricht Treaty), that move was
soundly rejected. 9
Just as newly developing states seek to participate in the global
economy today, so too did the nascent United States feel the need to
signal the world that theirs was a country (and an economy) that
could be trusted, where contracts would be honored and investments
would be safe, despite the fact that it was organized as a representative
democracy.40
Economic issues lay at the heart of the American constitutional
compact. As Gordon Wood notes, what James Madison found
"[p]articularly alarming and unjust" as he surveyed the American po-
litical scene on the eve of the constitutional convention "were the pa-
per money acts, stay laws, and other forms of debtor-relief legislation
that hurt creditors and violated individual property rights."41 Democ-
racy wasn't going to be the solution since "democracy was the prob-
lem."42 It seems the American Revolution "had unleashed acquisitive
and commercial forces that no one had quite realized existed."4
Madison asserted that "the most common and durable source of fac-
tions has been the verious and unequal distribution of property," but
that unequal distribution is the result of the "diversity in the faculties
of men" and it is "[t] he protection of these faculties" that is "the first
object of government."44 Though he went on to author the Bill of
Rights, Madison was ambivalent about adding them to the Constitu-
37. See Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Governments and the
European Court ofJustice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121, 126 (1998) (discussing the development of the
European Court of Justice's oversight role).
38. Id. at 128-29; see also Silverstein, supra note 24, at 432-36 (discussing the European
Court of Justice's role in the spillover effect).
39. Alter, supra note 37, at 140-41.
40. See Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in
BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
69, 107-09 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) (discussing the early debate over the eco-
nomic principles embedded in the U.S. Constitution).
41. Id. at 73.
42. Id. at 75.
43. Id. at 77.
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 78-79.
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tion.45 He, like Alexander Hamilton, felt that many of the most im-
portant protections were already included in the body of the
Constitution itself.46 And consider what is present in that document:
The Commerce Clause,47 Contract Clause,4" the ban against ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder;49 rules concerning taxation,5 ° the
coining of money,5" copyrights and patents;5 2 and the protection for
at least some forms of property (the Fugitive Slave Clause, for exam-
ple)." Whether the Federalists were more driven by pecuniary inter-
ests (as Charles Beard so explosively charged in 1913)" 4 or by a
genuine commitment to the ideals of disinterested patriotism, protec-
tion for property and economic interests were laced into the Constitu-
tion and provided some of the most powerful justifications for judicial
review.
III. RIGHTS AND NORMS
Rights and norms constitute a third fundamental imperative driv-
ing systems toward strong judicial review. Jon Elster is quite right to
say that although "self-serving arguments tend to dress themselves in
public-interest garbs, the converse argument-that all impartial argu-
ment is nothing but self-interest in disguise-is invalid."55 This reduc-
tionist claim, he adds, "is internally incoherent. If nobody was ever
moved by the public interest, nobody would have anything to gain by
appealing to it. Self-serving appeals to the public interest are parasitic
on genuine appeals."56 Reluctantly admitting that in thinking about
judicial review it is "imperative" to "consider the dreaded topic of
rights," Shapiro acknowledges that in addition to his conviction that
"[d] ivision of powers systems generate judicial review," it may be un-
45. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 THE RE-
PUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON
1776-1826, at 563-66 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
46. Id. at 564; THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 17, at 510.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
48. Id. § 10, cl. 1.
49. Id. § 9, cl. 3.
50. Id. § 8, cl. 1; id. § 9, cls. 4, 5.
51. Id. § 8, cl. 5; id, § 10, cl. 1.
52. Id. § 8, cl. 8.
53. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
54. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 152-88 (1913).
55. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364,
379 (1995).
56. Id at 380.
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avoidable to conclude that "[i]deological commitments to individual
rights generate judicial review" as well. 57
New constitutions are most often "written in the wake of a crisis
or exceptional circumstance of some sort. ' 58 And though such times
present opportunities to pursue and lock in personal and group ad-
vantage, they also tend to trigger another core human instinct-an
interest in a place in history, an other-directed moment when ques-
tions of abstract right and norms can at least temporarily trump indi-
vidual avarice and power hunger. This passion can operate hand-in-
hand with the understanding that such opportunities are fleeting and
rare. As Thomas Paine sagely warned in Common Sense, "[w]hen we
are planning for posterity, we ought to remember, that virtue is not
hereditary. ' 59 And though Beard wasn't wrong about some of the
Federalists and their own economic interests,6 ° it turns out that many
of the staunchest Federalists were debtors, not creditors, whose de-
fense of "a moral and social order that had been prescribed by the
Revolution and the most enlightened thinking of the eighteenth cen-
tury" cannot be written off to individual economic interest.6"
In the South African case, the commitment to rights is compli-
cated. Though the notion of a bill of rights was seen by many as a
means to protect the former ruling minority of whites, there was also a
sense that a bill of individual rights might counteract the argument for
"group and minority rights which were the basis of the apartheid re-
gime's proposals."62 Albie Sachs, a member of the African National
Congress's (ANC) Executive Committee and its Constitutional Com-
mittee, said that he felt "trepidation" about arguing for "a bill of rights
based on the principled reason that a future government could not
always be trusted, rather than on merely tactical and strategic
grounds."6 But, although he made that argument, the ANC accepted
a bill of rights, and Sachs went on to become ajudge on South Africa's
constitutional court where he has become one of South Africa's most
vociferous advocates for strong judicial review.64 Not only did the
ANC agree to establish a constitutional court and strong judicial re-
57. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 199-200.
58. Elster, supra note 55, at 370.
59. THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS 5, 44 (Eric
Foner ed., 1995).
60. BEARD, supra note 54, at 152-88.
61. Wood, supra note 40, at 109.
62. KLUG, supra note 2, at 77.
63. Id. at 76-77.
64. Id. at 166 (noting how once on the court, Sachs took a positivist approach to the
constitution).
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view, but the ANC joined with the white-minority government to ap-
prove the requirement that the court would have the final say in
determining whether or not the final negotiated constitutional agree-
ment itself fulfilled the mandates and principles announced in the
1993 interim constitution.65 Thus, in the pursuit of substantive norms
which were embodied in thirty-four principles, both major parties
agreed to establish a very powerful, independent, and binding institu-
tion. Principle II, for example, states that "[e]veryone shall enjoy all
universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties,
which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justicia-
b/e provisions in the Constitution.
66
It is certainly true that the ruling minority turned to a constitu-
tion and strong judicial review as a political prerequisite to accepting
majority rule, but both the minority and majority had an acute under-
standing of the value of fundamental rights-in the ruling minority's
case, it was a sense of the violation of rights posed by the possibility of
majority tyranny; in the majority's case, four generations of discrimi-
nation under apartheid rule had led to more than a mere rhetoric of
rights and the need for the protection of human dignity.
67
One of the few things that oppressors and oppressed share is a
finely sharpened understanding of the meaning of freedom and its
opposite. It is no coincidence that some of the most impassioned ar-
guments for liberty in the American Revolution came out of the slave-
holding South.6" Whether it was Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or
give me death," or Thomas Jefferson's impassioned words about lib-
erty in the Declaration of Independence, southerners, black and
white, have long shared an intimate understanding of liberty that was
perhaps more visceral than that of those who had never experienced
slavery-either as slaves or masters.6"
65. See id. at 140-44 (discussing the creation of the constitutional court and constitu-
tional review).
66. EBRAHIM, supra note 2, at 619 (emphasis added). Among the thirty-four principles,
a number of substantive norms and rights were inserted, including a prohibition of all
"racial, gender and other forms of discrimination" and a requirement that the constitution
"shall promote racial and gender equality and national unity" (Principle III); a require-
ment that "[t]he legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equita-
ble legal process" (Principle V); and a guaranteed protection for, and promotion of, "[t]he
diversity of language and culture" (Principle XI), among others. Id. at 619-20.
67. See KLUG, supra note 2, at 76-77 (discussing fundamental rights as both going
against the Apartheid regime and preserving the privileges of the white minority).
68. WILLAM COOPER, LIBERTY AND SLAVERV. SOUTHERN POLITICS TO 1860, at 30-31
(1983).
69. See generally RICHARD HILORETH, DESPOTISM IN AMERICA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NA-
TURE AND RESULTS OF THE SLAVE-HOLDING SYSaM IN THE UNITED STATES 92-96 (Negro Univ.
Press 1968) (1854) (describing how slavery affects the liberty of slave owners and all free
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The U.S. Constitution certainly enshrined rights-not only in the
Bill of Rights which went virtually unenforced in the Supreme Court's
formative years-but also in the body of the Constitution itself.
Though the Constitution is overwhelmingly concerned with process,
institutional order, and federalism, it does not lack for vital norms and
even rights. The rights of property are, of course, deeply embedded
in the constitutional text.7" But rights were deeply implicated in other
areas. Consider an oft-overlooked clause of the Constitution that was
of intimate and vital concern to the Founders: article III, section 3-
the Treason Clause.71 Not only does this clause define treason and
spell out the process for trial and conviction, it embodies much of
what distinguished the United States from its colonial master. "[N]o
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, ex-
cept during the life of the person attainted"72 meant that in the
United States, guilt would be individual and neither hereditary nor
assigned to groups.
The primary route employed by the modern Court to discover
and enforce rights (the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments) first came into its own as a guarantor of the
rights of contract and property.73 Focusing on the word law in the
"due process of law" clause, the Justices argued that this presumed
that the law in question was a rational exercise of government
power.7 4 No amount of process, the Court suggested, could possibly
save an irrational law.75 And laws that-in the opinion of the Jus-
tices-arbitrarily infringed on fundamental rights to property were, by
definition, irrational and had to be rejected by the Court. 76 "Life, lib-
erty and property," Justice Joseph P. Bradley wrote in one of the first
cases to test the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause, are "fundamental rights" that "can only be interfered
with . . . by lawful regulations. '77 And any regulation that "arbitrarily
people); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, repinted- in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 187, 277-79 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden
eds., 1944); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814), in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra, at 641, 641-42 (same).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. Id. at art. III, § 3.
72. Id.
73. EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND PRIVACY:. TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUB-
STANTIVE DUE PROCESS 112-23 (1996).
74. Id. at 213-14.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
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assailed" the right to property could not be upheld.78 Finding sub-
stantive fundamental rights in the procedural requirements of the
Due Process Clause came to be known as the doctrine of substantive
due process.
Though the Court removed itself from close scrutiny of economic
regulation, the Justices did not forsake the doctrine of substantive due
process. What changed was the type of government interference with
liberty that would trigger the Court's scrutiny: Simple economic regu-
lation now routinely would pass the Court's test.79 But the same doc-
trines the Justices had developed (and then repudiated) on the
economic front were applied in social and political arenas where the
Court would apply far more exacting levels of scrutiny, striking down
laws that infringed on what the Justices perceived to be fundamental
rights to travel freely within the country, to procreate (or not), to live
with an extended family, to marry those of a different race, to educate
one's children in foreign languages, and to guarantee personal
privacy.80
Turning to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), we can argue
about the intentions and objectives of the judges in Luxembourg, but
there is no doubt that they have been heavily pressured to more ac-
tively enforce not just economic agreements, but a far deeper and
broader basket of fundamental rights. In a series of cases, the ECJ
announced that it would, indeed, enforce constitutional rights recog-
nized and enforced by the community as a whole and by individual
member states. 8'
78. Id.
79. KEYwES, supra note 73, at 146.
80. The right to travel was upheld under the Commerce Clause in Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941), and used to invalidate a California law that sought to keep poor
people from moving to the state; the right to live with one's extended family was estab-
lished in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); the right to interracial mar-
riage was established in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); the right to educate children
in a foreign language was established in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); the right
guaranteeing personal privacy was upheld in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982), and LucAs A. PowE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS (2000), for a detailed discussion of the Court's treatment of legislation
interfering with fundamental rights.
81. Case 26/69, Strauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419; Case 11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case 4/73, Nold v.
Comm'n of the European Communities, 1975 E.R.C. 985. See Alec Stone Sweet, Constitu-
tional Dialogues in the European Community, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL
COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 305, 314-16 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds.,
1998) (discussing the response of different European nations to the ECJ's jurisprudence);
Jason Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 12
LEGAL STUD. 227, 227-28 (1992) (stating that the ECJ has used fundamental rights to ex-
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We even see rights as an imperative in as unlikely a setting as the
authoritarian Republic of Singapore, where the High Court judges
stood up to the ruling party (of which each judge was a member in
good and long standing) to declare that even in the case of national
security, "[i] t is inconceivable that a law which gave absolute power to
arrest and detain without reasonable justification would be tolerated
by a Constitution such as the present, one of the principal purposes of
which is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms."82
IV. THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE
Political imperatives comprise a fourth nucleotide of strong judi-
cial review. Whether to avoid responsibility and shift blame, to
demonstrate commitment, to secure rights or economic advantages,
or to avoid system failure or secure a slipping power alignment, strong
judicial review is often part of a tradeoff, part of a deal, the result of
compromise: In short, the product of politics.
There are many political reasons to adopt or accept strong judi-
cial review. Whether it is to advance power and influence, secure
them, or protect against their abuse, politicians and judges alike are
constantly weighing political costs and benefits. In the European case,
member-state politicians had much to gain by shifting responsibility
(and blame) for the costs of economic integration onto the faceless
bureaucrats in Brussels and the imperious judges of Luxembourg. In
South Africa, the minority rulers sought protection in judicial review
as they released their control of power while the majority made a cal-
culated tradeoff to accomplish their greater goal.8 3 But the political
imperative is not limited to the formation of a new constitutional sys-
tem. Political crisis can spark a turn to the courts to break through
political logjams as happened in the United States over slavery and
integration among other issues.84 But politics is more than just a trig-
ger for the turn to strong judicial review. It may actually be a neces-
sary precondition for it: Singapore, for example, seems nearly devoid
of any political pressure that might produce stronger judicial review,
tend its jurisdiction and accelerate integration between member states); G. Federico Man-
cini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MoD. L. REv. 175,
186-88 (1994) (discussing the ECJ's creation of a catalogue of fundamental rights).
82. Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, 1988 SLR 132, 1988 LEXIS 247, at
*261. Singapore soon chained itsjunkyard dog, limiting the court's ability to nip the gov-
ernment in the arena of individual rights-and did so by precisely following the rules laid
out in the Singapore Constitution itself. Silverstein, supra note 24, at 436-40.
83. KtuG, supra note 2, at 76-77.
84. See MARK GRABER, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (forthcoming
2006).
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and that deficit along with the constitutional rules may help explain
Singapore's lack of strong judicial review.85
As Tom Ginsberg argues, when minority rulers prepare to adopt
a majority-rule democratic system, they have a powerful political in-
centive to protect their interests against minority tyranny through
written constitutions enforced by insulated courts exercising strong
judicial review.8 6 This was as true of the American Federalists as it was
of the National Party in South Africa. The staunchly Federalist presi-
dent who lost the 1800 election to Thomas Jefferson was determined
to protect the Federalist agenda by loading the judicial branch with
last-minute Federalist appointees.8 7 For the Federalists, the courts
would be the last line of defense against what they feared would be an
abuse of power by their opponents.
Politicians have many good political reasons to turn to the courts.
Some simply want an issue resolved, taken off the table; others will
turn to the courts to accomplish policy goals "they privately favor but
cannot openly endorse without endangering their political support. "88
The starkest example of the political turn to the courts may have been
Dred Scott v. Sandford 9 which "epitomizes political attempts to steer a
disruptive partisan fight into safer legal channels."9 °
Though he had advance knowledge of the Court's pending deci-
sion in Dred Scott, President James Buchanan feigned ignorance and,
in his inaugural address urged the nation to accept the Court's ruling
as an impartial verdict on what the Constitution would-and would
not-tolerate.91 The Supreme Court was hailed by many as the appro-
priate forum to resolve the issue, a position articulated by Sen. Ste-
phen Douglas, popular for his famous campaign debates with
Abraham Lincoln in 1858.92 Dred Scott heralded the availability of an
85. See Silverstein, supra note 24, at 439-40 (describing how politicians acted quickly to
remove judicial review from the courts in internal security cases following a controversial
judicial decision).
86. TOM GINSBERG, JUDiCIAL REviEw IN NEw DEMOCRACIES 21-22 (2003).
87. SeeJennifer Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the
Constitution, 96 HARV. L. REv. 340, 352 (1982) (book review) (describing how the federal
judiciary became the center of the controversy between Federalists and Republicans after
Jefferson's victory). It was, of course, the appointment of William Marbury to a judicial
post that generated Marbury v. Madison and inaugurated the Supreme Court's exercise of
judicial review. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 153-54 (1803).
88. Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
STUD. Am. POL. DEv. 35, 43-44 (1993); see also R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoid-
ance, 6J. PuB. PoL'v 4, 371 (1986).
89. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
90. Graber, supra note 88, at 45.
91. Id. at 48-49.
92. Id. at 48.
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alternative forum for the resolution of political disputes and beat a
path that would be returned to with increasing frequency as the Civil
War faded and America's industrial revolution took root. 3 The slav-
ery dilemma impelled American politicians to turn to law to resolve
what public policy seemingly could not. And it was the continuing
effects of slavery that led them back to court again. Although one can
debate the ultimate utility of the Court's intervention in desegrega-
tion, the Court filled a void, not only ordering the end of school seg-
regation, but actively implementing and administering programs
meant to accomplish that goal, including large-scale busing plans.9
4
Blame avoidance goes a long way toward understanding the polit-
ical imperative behind the grudging acceptance of strong judicial re-
view by the political actors in the European member states.9 The
belief that an "ever closer Union" is essential for economic survival is
widely shared, and parliamentarians can reap political benefits from a
united Europe, but there are also significant domestic costs. Those
costs dissipate, of course, if the blame for them can be shifted to Euro-
pean judges and bureaucrats. For the member-state chief executives,
there is an additional incentive-power shifted by court order from
member state to Brussels is power shifted from a domestic legislature
where that chief executive has to protect his or her electoral flanks to
the European Commission and Council, where member-state chief ex-
ecutives act with far greater autonomy and many more degrees of free-
dom. In a convoluted way, one might argue that member-state
legislatures are delegating power to their own chief executives, albeit
through the sieve of the European Council and Commission.96 As
with the member-state judiciaries, European mandates and European
supremacy then can allow member-state chief executives to exercise
executive powers that might be impossible in party-driven domestic
parliaments, but entirely viable in an executive-driven central organ
such as the European Council.
This, of course, then feeds back to create both institutional and
political incentives for parliamentarians to accept strong judicial re-
view from Luxembourg. As long as progress toward an ever-closer
union remains asymptotic-ever-closer, but never really crossing into
93. GORDON SILVERSTEIN, How LAW KILLS POLITICS (forthcoming 2006).
94. J. ANTHONY LuKAs, COMMON GROUND 231-33 (1986); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE 42-46 (1991).
95. Weaver, supra note 88, at 371-72.
96. J.H.H. Weiler et al., European Democracy and Its Critique: Five Uneasy Pieces (Harvard
Jean Monnet Working Paper, Paper No. 1, 1995), available at http://www.jeanmonnetpro-
gram.org/papers/95/9501ind.html.
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the land of supranational governance 9 7-the European Court's con-
stitutional space widens, not only as the result of institutions and
rights imperatives, but the political appeal of blame avoidance inti-
mately linked to a complex institutional structure.
Building an Explanation for Judicial Review: We know that cons titu-
tionalism is not the same as judicial review, that empowering "courts
to enforce constitutional clauses is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for the development of a constitutional regime. " " While a
study of each of these driving imperatives (institutional, economic,
normative, political) helps us understand why particular versions of
strong courts emerge in particular cases, is it possible to develop a
more comprehensive theory that would help us understand not only
why we see strong judicial review emerge where it does, but that might
explain when it is likely to happen, and how it is likely to unfold?
The European experience helps illustrate the complex ways in
which the four imperatives may interact. Economic incentives may
well have persuaded the original member states to accept and even
embrace an active central court. But why was that needed? The court
allowed them to sidestep a difficult if not intractable political prob-
lem-they could move toward broadly agreed-upon norms without
paying an extraordinary and intolerable domestic political price. As
the court developed, the judges themselves played an important role,
but that role was only possible because of the unique institutional
structure within which they functioned. Not only was power divided
between the European government and the member states along a
vertical plane, but along the horizontal plane of the European govern-
ment itself. With no European legislative branch with which to con-
tend, and with a European executive branch that was strangely tied to
the political and institutional concerns of the executives of the mem-
ber states who were worried at least as much about their own back-
benchers and domestic opposition as they were about Europe-wide
issues, there was clearly a need for a European institution to assert,
define, and protect European interests. The court helped fill that vac-
uum. As the court grew in stature and power and legitimacy, its own
rulings no longer could naturally be contained within a strictly eco-
nomic zone. Judicial interests in rights and pressure from member
states such as Italy and Germany along with interest groups, litigators,
voters, and politicians at all levels, pressed the court to expand from
97. The recent rejection of the new European Constitution by voters in France and the
Netherlands suggests there may be a limit.
98. John Ferejohn et al., Editors' Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMO-
CRATIC RULE, supra note 15, at 13.
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the economic realm, and its rulings soon came to be powerfully felt in
questions of rights and norms far removed from economics. 99
Interests cannot be totally disaggregated from the other strands
of the DNA of judicial review. Interests are, of course, intimately tied
up with institutions as they are with normative commitments and po-
litical objectives. As Robert Kagan notes, "[a] structurally fragmented
state is especially open to popular and interest group demands."
100
Structure, then, invites interests, and interests, in turn, powerfully
shape the structure of the institutions in which they ultimately func-
tion. Similarly, economic objectives are merely about self-interest for
some, while for others economic rights are just that-rights, norma-
tive or ideological commitments in themselves. In the United States,
for example, though no one particular economic ideology was built
into the Constitution, Russell Hardin argues that "something vaguely
approaching the free market was. At the very least, the constitution
enabled capitalism ...."101 This is largely embodied in the Contract
and Commerce Clauses, which are "almost the doctrine of laissez-faire
defanged and made operational rather than ideological, at least for
the domestic economy. ' O° And as much as rights were linked with
interests, both explicitly were tied to institutions by James Madison
who understood that the best protection for rights was not "a mere
demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several
departments,"10 ' but rather a structure of government, a set of institu-
tions, designed to use even negative human attributes to accomplish
higher ends. "Ambition," he famously instructed, "must be made to
counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with
the constitutional rights of the place."10 4 Norms structure institu-
tions-and institutions shape and constrain the evolution of norms, a
fact that was recognized by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1810 when,
in Fletcher v. Peck,"°5 he argued that the State of Georgia was restrained
from revoking its contracts "either by general principles which are com-
99. Silverstein, supra note 24, at 434-36; Gordon Silverstein, Democracy and the Law:
Can Judicial Institutions Pave the Way to Legitimacy in Europe? (Sept. 3-7, 1998) (unpub-
lished paper delivered to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association
in Boston) (on file with author).
100. KAGAN, supra note 13, at 15.
101. Russell Hardin, Constitutional Economic Transition, in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND
DEMOCRATIC RULE, supra note 15, at 330.
102. Id. at 332.
103. TH4E FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 313.
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 17, at 322.
105. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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mon to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the con-
stitution of the United States."
116
Are these four imperatives necessary preconditions for the emer-
gence of strong judicial review? Is the total absence of any one of
them enough to undermine the emergence of strong courts? Is the
sequence in which they emerge, or their relative strengths, the key to
understanding not only why strong courts emerge (or don't), but how
and when it happens?
Even if the instinct is right (that there are a number of key vari-
ables that need to sequence in particular ways) are the variables or
imperatives discussed here even close to the right set? Or even close
to a complete set? Is one sequence or pattern more or less likely to
generate strong judicial review? Does one sequence produce predict-
able pathologies and another sequence predictable advantages? 10 7
These are increasingly more important questions as more and more
nations adopt constitutional systems and accept strong judicial review.
106. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
107. Pierson, supra note 18, at 251-52.
